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CONFRONTING UNCERTAINTY WITH  
DECENTRALIZED COMMAND
 On June 18, 1812, the United States declared war on Britain� Although the dec-laration hardly could be described as unexpected, given years of strained re-
lations, the United States did obtain a degree of surprise�1 This was inevitable given 
the distance between the two countries and the nature of period communications 
—it took weeks to transmit information between the United States and Britain� 
The slowness of communications created a window of vulnerability for British 
naval forces in North American waters�
Events in Britain only exacerbated the exposure of its naval forces� On June 8, 
ten days before the American declaration of war, a new government formed in 
London� One of its first acts constituted an attempt to ameliorate a major point 
of conflict with the United States: it suspended the restrictions on American 
commerce delineated in previous orders in council� Through late June and most 
of July, British leaders in London hoped their conciliatory gesture would lead to 
a favorable response� Little did they know that the Americans had declared war 
five days prior to Britain’s repeal of the orders�2
Only in late July did news of the American war reach London� British decision 
makers then had to consider whether the Americans, given the suspension of 
the orders in council, would back away from hos-
tilities� The uncertainty contributed to additional 
delays, and it was not until September 26 that new 
instructions and leadership reached Halifax, Nova 
Scotia�3
Between the June 18 declaration of war and 
the arrival of new instructions and leadership on 
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CONFRONTING UNCERTAINTY WITH
DECENTRALIZED COMMAND
September 26, British naval leaders in North American waters faced tremendous 
uncertainty� Vice Admiral Herbert Sawyer, commander of the North American 
station and the senior officer at Halifax, served as the theater commander for 
an area of operations that spanned southward from the Gulf of Saint Lawrence 
in the north, past Halifax and the Eastern Seaboard of the United States, to the 
northern edge of the Bahamas; Sawyer’s command stretched eastward to include 
Bermuda as well�4
Sawyer had to go to war with the force he had, not necessarily the warships 
he needed� He had to execute operations relying on old instructions and his 
understanding of British strategic priorities and intent� In an uncertain envi-
ronment, he had to lead British naval operations in theater while providing his 
political leaders with assessments of American intentions� Captain Philip Broke, 
commanding the thirty-eight-gun frigate Shannon, was the second key British 
naval decision maker in North American waters�5 He oversaw Sawyer’s principal 
strike force� Broke’s primary mission involved mitigating the threat the U�S� Navy 
posed� This article assesses how Sawyer and Broke made decisions, executed 
operations, managed risk, and dealt with uncertainty at the outbreak of the War 
of 1812�6
Royal Navy (RN) operations during the opening months of the War of 1812 
underscore the complexity of naval decision making at the campaign level� This is 
a subject that all too often is lost between descriptions of naval battles and general 
narratives of naval war� Yet a study in naval decision making aids in understand-
ing the relationship among governmental leaders, their theater commanders, and 
operational elements at sea�
THE WORLD SITUATION
Much of what Sawyer and Broke encountered at the outbreak of the War of 1812 
was expected� Naval leaders in the age of sail operated in an environment in 
which communications were slow, so officers had to be agile enough to deal with 
evolving circumstances, from minor incidents to acts of war� Naval officers had 
to be aware of government intent so their actions could fulfill broader objectives�
Yet the specific circumstances that Sawyer and Broke encountered were 
unique� Britain already was engaged in a protracted, multitheater war against 
Napoleonic France, with the Royal Navy operating in the role of the dominant 
naval power� The War of 1812 originated on the periphery of the larger conflict, 
meaning the isolation Sawyer and Broke faced was more extreme than their peers 
faced in European waters� This was not a new theater in an existing war against a 
familiar naval foe, but a new opponent in a geographically distant region fought 
in parallel with the ongoing Napoleonic struggle� For Britain, the existential 
threat was France, not the United States�
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THE SITUATION IN AMERICA
Even so, leaders in London recognized that something needed to be done� “As 
soon as the discussions in America began to take a serious turn,” the secretary 
of the British Admiralty explained, “the British government sent orders to their 
naval officers, not couched in doubtful terms, but in the plain good old English 
style�”7 Leaders in London understood that if the United States initiated hostili-
ties, their theater commander in American waters required guidance�
Sawyer received the following three directives, dated May 1812: 
 1� To repel any hostile aggression, but also take care not to commit one�
 2� In the event of a declaration of war by America, or the issue of letters of marque, 
or any invasion of the provinces and islands [of Canada], to commence and direct 
hostilities, and to sink, burn, or destroy American ships, and to pursue all other 
measures, offensive and defensive, for the annoyance of the enemy and the protec-
tion of his Majesty’s subjects�
 3� To exercise, except in the specified cases, all possible forbearance towards citizens 
of the United States�8
These three instructions sought to meet wider policy aims� Governmental lead-
ers in London attempted to minimize tensions by directing the Royal Navy to 
employ “all possible forbearance towards citizens of the United States�”9 They 
wanted to avoid a war that necessarily would drain assets from the primary war 
against France� If hostilities did occur, destroying American ships would deprive 
America of commerce while driving commerce into British protection� More-
over, the elimination of American warships and privateers that could threaten 
British merchant shipping forwarded “the protection of his Majesty’s subjects�”10 
Avoiding war was the best-case scenario, but if war did occur the initial naval 
object sought to limit America’s ability to use and disrupt the maritime commons�
Sawyer’s order “to sink, burn, or destroy American ships” highlighted the 
way to protect a critical vulnerability—Britain’s sea lines of communication 
(SLOCs)� The commerce that passed along these maritime arteries ensured 
Britain’s global economic position�11 In 1812, every major RN deployment had 
for its fundamental object the protection of British commercial interests, with 
naval stations arranged at terminal, choke, and transit points along the SLOCs�12 
Major trade routes included the link between the British Isles and their posses-
sions in the West Indies� These trade routes were largely dependent on prevailing 
currents and winds� The latter circled the Atlantic in a clockwise pattern� Ship-
ping outward bound from Britain plunged south until it reached the latitude 
of Barbados, where it caught trade winds that propelled it westward across the 
Atlantic� The return voyage to Britain followed the predictable current of the Gulf 
Stream� This brought such shipping close to the Eastern Seaboard of the United 
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States� Sawyer’s North American command mitigated threats to commerce on 
this part of the return voyage� At approximately the latitude of Boston, shipping 
pressed eastward into the Atlantic, using the Azores as a waypoint on its voyage 
to the British Isles�13 Moreover, Sawyer’s command was positioned to protect the 
terminal point of the sea-lanes between the British Isles and its possessions in 
Canada� The U�S� declaration of war put these sea-lanes at immediate risk� The 
instructions to Sawyer attempted to mitigate this vulnerability by directing him 
to destroy American warships, privateers, and merchant commerce� The object of 
ensuring the security of the SLOCs dominated the design and execution of Brit-
ish naval operations during the opening months of the War of 1812�
OPENING ENGAGEMENTS—AND CONFUSION
On June 23, 1812, about a hundred miles east of New York, lookouts aboard the 
thirty-six-gun British frigate Belvidera sighted a small squadron� Captain Richard 
Byron identified the strangers as American warships� Given his orders and the 
tension between the United States and Britain, he beat a hasty retreat, but the 
squadron gave chase� During the afternoon, the lead ship, the American frigate 
President under Commodore John Rodgers, opened fire� Only then did Byron 
allow his crew to engage� Three hours into the chase, Byron had his crew start 
the water over the side and cast nonessential items into the sea� Now lighter, Bel-
videra drew away from its pursuers� It had been a close-run affair�14 These were 
the opening shots of the War of 1812 at sea�
Four days later, Byron brought Belvidera into the harbor at Halifax, where he 
found Admiral Sawyer�15 Sawyer must have been unsure how to proceed� His 
most recent instructions directed him “[t]o repel any hostile aggression, but also 
take care not to commit one�”16 With regard to the latter, he had only to remember 
several previous shooting incidents between British and American warships� In 
1807, HMS Leopard had fired on the American frigate Chesapeake owing to a sus-
picion of British deserters aboard the American warship� Outrage in the United 
States nearly resulted in war� Four years later, in 1811, Rodgers, commanding 
President, almost destroyed the British warship Little Belt� This shooting incident 
occurred in the dark; both the British and the Americans thought the other at 
fault�17 Indicative of the early confusion over Belvidera’s encounter, one British 
periodical posited, “Our Government has expressed an opinion, that the attack 
made upon the Belvidera had neither resulted from any new orders of the Ameri-
can Government, nor was any proof that war had been decided on�”18
Was Belvidera’s engagement merely another incident, or was it war? Sawyer 
needed confirmation� If it had been a mere incident, an overzealous and aggres-
sive reaction could precipitate actual war; whereas if hostilities already existed, 
hesitation could result in the loss of British warships, commerce, or worse� 
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Sawyer’s instructions were clear: if he could confirm that a state of war existed, 
he was “to commence and direct hostilities�”19
Given the high level of uncertainty about American intentions, Sawyer’s first 
move involved the collection, assessment, and dissemination of intelligence� Less 
than a day after the battle-scarred Belvidera made Halifax, Sawyer dispatched 
the naval sloop Colibri to New York under a flag of truce to determine whether 
a state of war existed� He also sent vessels to London and Jamaica with details of 
the attack� Just in case it had not been an accident, he dispatched another warship 
to warn the commanding officer at Newfoundland and ask for reinforcements�20
All these reports were incomplete� Sawyer could only speculate about why the 
Americans had attacked Belvidera� Doing the best he could, Sawyer pieced to-
gether the disparate accounts he could glean from American newspapers and the 
dated reports of British diplomats�21 It took over a week after Belvidera reached 
Halifax to confirm the declaration of war� When Sawyer did receive indisputable 
proof of hostilities on July 5, it cost him another warship to carry this news to 
England�22
THE SITUATION IN HALIFAX
Sawyer’s response also had to take into account the means at his disposal� He had 
but twenty-three operational warships�23 On paper, this might appear impressive, 
but his area of operations required extensive deployments� Moreover, he had to 
provide escorts to convoys� Few warships were then at Halifax, or at least nothing 
approaching the combat power of the American squadron that nearly had over-
whelmed Belvidera� That the Admiralty in London had provided Sawyer with less 
than an optimal force might lead to accusations of mismanagement, considering 
that Britain was the dominant naval power, possessing approximately half the 
world’s warship tonnage�24 However, the navy as a whole was stretched thin, given 
global naval commitments and ongoing operations against Napoleonic France�25
On June 30, three days after the battle-damaged Belvidera had anchored at 
Halifax, the thirty-eight-gun frigate Shannon and the thirty-two-gun frigate 
Aeolus arrived� Captain Broke of Shannon related, “We came in five days from 
Bermuda—thinking all tranquil & pacific with America—& counting only on 
a dull tiresome refit at this port, before we could resume our cruize, � � � but on 
arriving here � � � we met rumours of war” (emphasis original)�26 Chance favored 
the British� Not only had Belvidera escaped, but a planned refit had brought two 
additional frigates to Halifax� Sawyer saw an opportunity� Belvidera completed 
hasty repairs and Sawyer’s flagship, the sixty-four-gun Africa, stood ready� With 
Shannon and Aeolus, the British had three frigates and a sixty-four-gun ship 
concentrated for operations� Sawyer thought this force sufficient to deal with the 
American squadron� Shannon, Africa, Belvidera, and Aeolus sailed from Halifax 
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on July 5 under the overall command of Captain Broke, just hours after receiving 
indisputable proof that the United States in fact had declared war�27
Rather than assigning Broke command of his most powerful naval detach-
ment, Sawyer surely wished to raise his flag in Africa and personally proceed 
in quest of the American squadron, but he remained at Halifax� The uncertain 
political and naval situation meant that Sawyer needed to stay in communica-
tion� At Halifax, Sawyer could coordinate better among the various elements of 
his command� He had no idea when reinforcements would arrive, he had yet to 
receive instructions from London detailing specific objectives or rules of engage-
ment, and he was unclear regarding what kind of war the Americans intended 
to wage� In addition, the location of the American squadron that had attacked 
Belvidera was unknown� Tracking down leads would require significant adapta-
tion, and this could draw the British squadron far from Halifax�
Moreover, Sawyer expected developments in the Gulf of Maine and its off-
shoot, the Bay of Fundy� This constricted area of water contained several im-
portant British Canadian ports, including Saint John, New Brunswick� To com-
plicate matters, the bordering New England states were the center of American 
maritime activity� Sawyer expected cities such as Boston, Salem, Gloucester, and 
Marblehead, Massachusetts, to fit out numerous privateers�28 Such commerce 
raiders possessed government-issued licenses to prey on British shipping but 
were owned, fitted out, and manned by private individuals, resulting in a state-
sanctioned business venture that sought profit from the capture of commerce 
belonging to hostile states�
The threat of American privateers materialized more slowly than expected, 
however� It took eight days after the declaration of war for the U�S� government to 
legalize their use�29 An additional factor delayed the sailing of privateers: in April 
1812, Congress had placed a ninety-day embargo on all American shipping� This 
prevented the sailing of American merchant ships, with the object of keeping the 
Royal Navy from sweeping them from the seas in the first weeks of a war� The 
embargo did not expire until July 4, 1812—and the government made no excep-
tion for privateers�30 As one U�S� newspaper aptly printed, “Is it not very odd that 
privateers would be prevented from sailing sixteen days after war is declared?”31
A narrow window of opportunity existed during which the Americans might 
have benefited from the Royal Navy’s ignorance of hostilities� That window had 
closed by the time American privateers entered the fray because HMS Indian, 
an eighteen-gun sloop, and Plumper, a ten-gun brig, already had reached the 
Bay of Fundy�32 Although this did not prevent American privateers from tak-
ing several quick prizes and even blockading the British Canadian port of Saint 
Andrews, British actions mitigated the damage� Sawyer assessed the threat as 
severe� When Spartan, a thirty-eight-gun frigate, returned to Halifax on July 
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9, Sawyer dispatched it to the Bay of Fundy� The thirty-six-gun Maidstone, the 
first wartime reinforcement to reach Sawyer’s command, joined Spartan� British 
warships alternated among escorting convoys, including a hastily organized one 
of a hundred vessels; patrolling to sweep up privateers; and conducting small 
raids up rivers to neutralize privateers in their nests�33 The British had significant 
success, taking more than twenty privateers between mid-July and mid-August, 
with nearly all the captures occurring in the waters between the Bay of Fundy 
and Halifax�34
Sawyer’s decision to remain at Halifax instead of sailing in quest of Rodgers’s 
squadron also allowed for the more effective employment of eleven reinforc-
ing warships� Quietly dispatched between mid-May and July, they trickled into 
North American waters during the early months of the war� The Admiralty had 
intended these warships to take the place of those cycling home with convoys and 
to provide limited reinforcements to buttress Sawyer’s command in the midst of 
worsening tensions with the United States� But they served a different purpose, 
giving Sawyer additional options and helping to soften the initial blows to British 
commerce�35
TWO SQUADRONS
With Admiral Sawyer remaining at Halifax to manage naval deployments across 
the theater of operations, Captain Broke had a more specific objective: dealing 
with Commodore Rodgers and his squadron of American warships� The British 
decision to seek out the American squadron rested on the assessment that Rod-
gers posed the most dangerous threat to British maritime interests� He had the 
strength to eliminate British warships, put SLOCs at risk, and savage a valuable 
convoy� Whereas American privateers aimed at inflicting cumulative losses on 
British maritime commerce over a protracted period, Rodgers’s squadron in a 
single blow could inflict significant damage, not just to commercial shipping, but 
even to British warships�
Sawyer had two choices when developing instructions for Broke� He could 
provide restrictive orders, in an effort to maintain tighter control, or he could 
provide his intent, trusting his subordinate to execute operations effectively� 
During the period of uncertainty at the outbreak of the conflict, it was unclear 
whether the Americans expected direct aid from France� Sawyer worried that 
such aid would manifest as a combined expedition aimed at Halifax� In hind-
sight, an attack on Halifax was beyond the means of the United States; however, 
the possibility caused Sawyer concern during July 1812, and he had no way to 
recall Broke in the event such an attack transpired�36 Given this factor alone, there 
certainly was much to be said for keeping tight control over Broke’s detachment�
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However, the nature of communications, coupled with the scarcity of warships, 
led Sawyer to choose a decentralized command model� The speed of communi-
cations limited any attempt at control because it would stifle Broke’s initiative� 
This was particularly true given the uncertainty about the Rodgers squadron� 
Restrictive orders would make an encounter with the American squadron less 
likely� Sawyer explained to Broke that his actions “must depend on information 
you may from time to time obtain either of the situation or movements of the 
American Squadron or other circumstances, and it is left to your judgement and 
discretion to act as shall appear to you best for His Majesty’s Service�” Sawyer 
prioritized forward deployments, but this caused Sawyer to explain to Broke, “I 
have no means of keeping up a communication with you, till the arrival of rein-
forcements from England�”37 Without reserves, Sawyer became isolated from the 
operational elements of his command� Sawyer decided to trust Broke to make 
informed decisions�
Four days out, Broke’s squadron linked up with the thirty-eight-gun British 
frigate Guerriere�38 Broke now controlled four frigates and a ship of the line� This 
was a powerful squadron, especially when viewed as a percentage of Sawyer’s 
overall command� At the outbreak of hostilities, Sawyer controlled five true frig-
ates; Broke now had four of them in his squadron, leaving only Spartan for other 
assignments� Also attached to Broke’s squadron was the sixty-four-gun Africa� 
Launched in 1781 and hardly considered a frontline warship by 1812, Admiralty 
documents still described Africa as a third-rate ship of the line—the sole warship 
larger than a frigate in Sawyer’s entire command�39
Thus, Sawyer had depleted the combat power of his entire command to pro-
vide Broke with an effective force� It now fell on Broke to determine the location 
of Rodgers’s squadron� The last positive intelligence was over two weeks old, dat-
ing from Belvidera’s running fight� Broke had to make an educated guess regard-
ing what Rodgers had done in the meantime� He concluded that the Americans 
most likely had returned to either Boston or New York, the principal ports with 
the maritime infrastructure to sustain a powerful American naval squadron� 
Therefore Broke took his squadron toward Nantucket, to place his ships between 
those two cities� He hoped to lure Rodgers out for a fight by attacking trade in the 
area�40 Broke maintained that he would “continue to destroy all such as are not 
worth our sending in � � � and hope thus to make the Enemy feel the Evils of the 
War they have so wantonly began�”41
Then, on July 12, Broke fell in with Colibri, the flag-of-truce vessel Sawyer had 
sent to New York� Several British diplomats had taken passage aboard Colibri there, 
and they provided Broke with intelligence on the strength of Rodgers’s squadron� It 
contained the forty-four-gun President, the forty-four-gun United States, the thirty-
six-gun Congress, the eighteen-gun Hornet, and the sixteen-gun Argus�42
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Sawyer had dispatched Broke’s command with an object of defeating the 
American squadron� How well would the sixty-four-gun Africa, the thirty-eight-
gun Shannon, the thirty-eight-gun Guerriere, the thirty-six-gun Belvidera, and 
the thirty-two-gun Aeolus have done in an engagement with Rodgers’s com-
mand? First, it should be noted that the rated number of guns provides only an 
approximation of combat power; most of the warships mentioned above mount-
ed more than their rated number of guns� The rating system itself was a legacy 
system that did not take into account developments such as the introduction 
of the short-range carronade� Moreover, the Americans had a tendency to rate 
warships smaller than they actually were—this served a propaganda purpose�43 
In this case, it meant that the thirty-six-gun Congress displaced roughly two 
hundred tons more, and had a slightly heavier broadside, than either the thirty-
eight-gun Shannon or the thirty-eight-gun Guerriere�44
How the British warships compared with forty-four-gun American warships 
such as President and United States is a particularly thorny question� William 
James, a contemporary observer and the first British historian of the war, argued 
that warships such as President were built of heavier timbers than seventy-four-
gun British ships of the line�45 In a later study, Theodore Roosevelt countered, 
“The American 44-gun frigate was a true frigate�”46 In reality, President and 
United States displaced about 40 percent more than thirty-eight-gun frigates such 
as Shannon and Guerriere and 50 percent more than thirty-six-gun frigates such 
as Belvidera� In terms of armament, the principal battery of the American war-
ships consisted of twenty-four-pound guns, while British frigates such as Shan-
non, Guerriere, and Belvidera mounted eighteen-pound guns� In comparison 
with a sixty-four-gun ship such as Africa, President and United States displaced 
approximately 150 tons more, had a similar complement, and threw a broadside 
that was one hundred pounds heavier, albeit with a larger percentage of short-
range carronades�47
Considering the above information, the two squadrons were fairly equal in 
aggregate combat power, but several factors gave the British a slight advantage� 
Although each squadron contained five warships, the small sizes of the Ameri-
cans’ Hornet and Argus would make them very fragile instruments of war in any 
engagement� Moreover, two-thirds of Rodgers’s total broadside weight consisted 
of carronades, including almost the entire armament of Hornet and Argus; car-
ronades comprised only 40 percent of the British broadside weight�48 In a long-
range engagement, the Americans would have to rely on two oversized frigates 
and one just a bit more powerful than Shannon to fight a sixty-four-gun ship and 
four smaller frigates�
Although the odds were in Broke’s favor, he worried that Rodgers had linked 
up with other U�S� frigates� Information gleaned from American newspapers 
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indicated that the thirty-two-gun Essex likely had joined the American squadron� 
And Broke believed that Constitution, the third forty-four-gun American frigate, 
also might have joined Rodgers�49 The addition of either of these warships would 
tilt the odds in Rodgers’s favor�
In the worst case, Broke’s command had the combat power to inflict enough 
damage to make the American squadron a nonfactor in the coming months� By 
the time the Americans had repaired any battle damage, British naval reinforce-
ments would have shifted the naval balance in American waters permanently�
OFF NEW YORK
The diplomats aboard Colibri also informed Broke that Rodgers had not returned 
to port after his action with Belvidera� “It was generally believed they were 
gone in search of the homeward bound West Indies Fleet under convoy of the 
Thalia�”50 Although this was accurate information, Broke needed confirmation, 
so he proceeded toward the entrance to Long Island Sound�51 On July 14, he left 
his squadron over the horizon and brought Shannon inshore to gather intelli-
gence about the American squadron� Specifically, Broke sought local fishermen 
or those involved in the coasting trade; such individuals stayed connected with 
events ashore and had access to local newspapers�52
Since it was unlikely that an American would speak with a British naval 
captain knowingly, Broke perpetrated a ruse� He hoisted American colors over 
Shannon and pretended to be the U�S� frigate Congress� It would take an extremely 
educated eye to tell Congress and Shannon apart: their dimensions were nearly 
identical and each mounted eighteen-pounders on its main gun deck�53 (Flying 
false colors was a perfectly legitimate deception that all navies of this period used; 
the deception became dishonorable only if one fired on an opponent while still 
under a false flag�)54
In two separate incidents, Broke lured fishermen aboard Shannon� He even 
told them that he had parted company with Commodore Rodgers after running 
low on water� Broke described the fishermen as “thoroughly deceived,” for they 
provided him with significant information, including accurate details about the 
engagement with Belvidera�55 Since Broke knew the correctness of this news, he 
viewed the remaining information as more reliable, including reports that Rod-
gers had pursued a homeward-bound British West India convoy�56 The informa-
tion gleaned from the fishermen, in combination with the reports received from 
the diplomats aboard Colibri, indicated that Rodgers had pursued a West India 
convoy� But Broke remained skeptical; although the diplomats and fishermen had 
provided similar information, Broke worried that the newspapers on which the 
intelligence was based were inaccurate� Broke announced, “I shall anxiously seek 
for some further accounts of the American Squadron�”57
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Broke was not the only one attempting to locate Rodgers; U�S� Secretary of 
the Navy Paul Hamilton also wanted to find him� At the outbreak of hostilities, 
Hamilton had given Rodgers permission to surprise British warships in the off-
ing before “returning immediately after into port�”58 However, after attacking 
Belvidera Rodgers did not follow Hamilton’s instructions� It took several weeks 
for Hamilton to realize that Rodgers was seeking bigger objectives than isolated 
British warships� The arrival of British warships on the U�S� coast caused Hamil-
ton’s apprehension to grow, so he dispatched the fourteen-gun Nautilus to locate 
Rodgers’s squadron� Nautilus proceeded to sea on July 15 with a difficult task� 
There were two squadrons at sea—one under Rodgers, the other under Broke� 
They were similar in size, and from a distance would look very much alike� Nau-
tilus’s challenge was to find the right squadron; at this it failed� Nautilus fell in 
with Broke’s command on July 16, and after a short chase became Broke’s prize�59
No sooner had Broke gobbled up Nautilus than his frigates chanced on Con-
stitution� The outbreak of hostilities had found the latter in Annapolis, Maryland, 
and in need of additional men� Hamilton ordered Constitution to join Rodgers 
at New York� The ship was off New Jersey when Broke’s squadron found it� After 
an epic chase, Constitution finally outran the British squadron on the morning 
of July 19�60
During the pursuit of Constitution, Broke’s squadron became badly strung out, 
with the frigates drawing well ahead of Africa and Nautilus; Africa, an old sixty-
four-gun ship, could hardly keep up with the more nimble frigates, and Nautilus 
was manned with only a prize crew� Africa’s captain, not waiting for instructions, 
sent Nautilus to Halifax with the information that Broke had obtained� Sawyer 
had not provided Broke the means to stay in contact, but the fortuitous capture 
of Nautilus alleviated this issue� Later, Broke described the captain of Africa as 
acting with “great judgement”: with only a prize crew, Nautilus added little to 
the British squadron but could provide Sawyer with valuable intelligence, and 
Africa’s captain seized the opportunity�61
The news Nautilus carried informed Sawyer of Broke’s movements over the 
previous two weeks� Broke consistently had positioned his squadron where 
Rodgers was most likely to come to him� Initially, Broke had expected Rodgers’s 
squadron to be anchored at either Boston or New York� He tried to draw Rodgers 
out for a fight by putting American commerce at risk� Simultaneously, he sought 
intelligence� What he obtained indicated that Rodgers was still at sea, likely in 
search of a convoy� If true, such intelligence changed Broke’s mission� While 
continuing to seek confirmation, Broke placed his command between Rod gers’s 
squadron at sea and his most likely base of operations at New York� In this loca-
tion, Broke’s squadron was positioned to snap up Nautilus and Constitution� The 
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latter escaped only by superior sailing� Broke accurately concluded that both 
Nautilus and Constitution also were on the lookout for Rodgers’s squadron�62
OF CONVOYS
After chasing Constitution, Broke pondered his next move� He needed to shift his 
squadron from its position off New York� The longer it remained, the more likely 
it became that Rodgers would divine Broke’s position and avoid him by seeking 
another port� Rather than gamble on the port to which Rodgers would return or 
search for the American squadron directly, and “[h]aving received undoubted 
information [that] Commodore Rogers [sic] was gone upon the Grand Bank of 
Newfoundland to lie [in] wait for our West India Convoys and considering the 
vast injury his squadron might do in that point,” Broke later would explain that 
“it appeared to me the more important duty to abandon the plan we had entered 
upon for distressing the Enemy trade, for the protection of our own�”63
Broke understood the centrality of Britain’s maritime trade� No matter how 
much he wanted to engage the American squadron or gain prize money by cap-
turing American merchant commerce, the ulterior objective of protecting British 
commerce remained paramount� So Broke sailed eastward across the Atlantic 
in quest of the West India convoy� Oddly enough, finding the convoy increased 
the likelihood of encountering Rodgers: since convoys sailed along predictable 
routes, this one would act as a magnet for the American commodore� By seeking 
out the convoy, Broke again was attempting to force Rodgers to come to him�
On the morning of July 29, the squadron exchanged signals with the convoy’s 
sole escort, the thirty-eight-gun frigate Thetis, about six hundred miles east of 
New York City�64 Broke explained, “This fleet was talked of confidentially in 
America as the chief object of Commodore Rogers’ [sic] hazardous enterprise;—
we shall at least ensure their safety, and I hope our escorting them may lead to a 
meeting of the Squadron�”65
But Broke’s assessment was flawed: although he had found a West India con-
voy, he had not found the one Rodgers had pursued� The convoy Broke located 
comprised approximately seventy ships and had sailed in early July; Rodgers 
instead had pursued the May convoy, comprising 120 merchant vessels escorted 
by the thirty-six-gun frigate Thalia and the eighteen-gun sloop Reindeer�66 After 
the running fight with Belvidera, Rodgers had approached the May convoy� Rod-
gers nipped at its heels between June 29 and mid-July; he received reports from 
several merchant vessels that the convoy was nearby; his squadron even sailed 
through garbage the convoy had left floating in its wake� But the pursuit was to 
no avail, and on July 13, when Rodgers was nearly into the approaches to the Eng-
lish Channel, he called it off� All this occurred before Broke even had captured 
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Nautilus� After Rodgers gave up his quest for the convoy, he made a large circuit 
of the Atlantic before heading home�67
The convoy Broke found was never in danger—but this assessment is available 
only from the perspective of hindsight� Both the Admiralty in London and Saw-
yer at Halifax approved of Broke’s actions�68 Given the convoy’s value, the weak-
ness of its escort, and the uncertainty of the American threat, the risk had been 
too high to act otherwise� The convoyed merchant vessels had arrived safely; the 
prime difficulty in assessing successful commerce defense involves understand-
ing why it worked� Rather than seeking the enemy and defeating it through a 
sequential series of actions, commerce protection involved the complex interplay 
of convoys, escorts, and patrols—and a high degree of chance� Only by knowing 
Rodgers’s position in relation to that of the convoy can one conclude that Broke 
did nothing either to deter the American squadron or to protect the convoy most 
at risk� Although Broke failed to bring Rodgers to battle, he had assessed the 
available intelligence, understood the centrality of commerce in Britain’s grand 
strategy, and concentrated his squadron at a decisive point—in this case, in rela-
tion to a convoy� Instead of directly seeking battle with Rodgers, Broke prioritized 
Britain’s trading empire, understanding that this course of action was the most 
likely way to bring Rodgers to him�
So Broke’s squadron stayed with the convoy as it lumbered toward England� 
Africa and Thetis provided direct protection, while the frigates chased down 
sightings� One of these turned out to be an American merchant vessel that had 
encountered Rodgers’s squadron on July 10� Broke learned that Rodgers had 
not pursued Thetis’s convoy but instead was ahead of it� Prevailing currents and 
winds would make it difficult for Rodgers to double back and attack the convoy 
that Broke now protected� Thus, it was reasonably safe� Even so, Broke split his 
squadron, leaving Africa and Guerriere to assist Thetis in shepherding the flock 
of merchantmen�69
At longitude 45 degrees W, these two warships followed Broke’s orders and 
parted with the convoy� Over the next week, they slowly clawed their way back to-
ward Halifax� On the afternoon of August 14, Guerriere and Africa intentionally 
went separate ways: Africa steered for Halifax, carrying Broke’s official reports, 
while Guerriere continued on patrol� Only five days after parting with Africa, 
Guerriere encountered Constitution� The ensuing battle resulted in the first sig-
nificant British naval loss of the war�70
GROPING IN THE DARK—TO LITTLE EFFECT
Meanwhile, Broke took Shannon, Belvidera, and Aeolus toward the American 
coast, where he hoped to intercept Rodgers� Broke was now attempting to con-
front the American squadron with only three frigates, since he had gleaned from 
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various sources of intelligence that Rodgers also had three frigates, not four or 
even five as Broke once had believed�71 Another factor in Broke’s decision to con-
front Rodgers with a reduced force stemmed from his assessment of the U�S� Navy� 
When Broke learned of Constitution’s victory over Guerriere, he concluded, “We 
are all eager for an opportunity of convincing the Yankees how much they are in-
debted to chance for their success in this contest� Their force is superior in ship & 
metal & number of men—but not in skill or courage equal” (emphasis original)�72 
Broke did not respect his opponent, and it can be assumed that he thought the 
crews of his three smaller frigates equal to the task of defeating Rodgers’s more 
powerful frigates�
However, by reducing his squadron to three frigates Broke had accepted ad-
ditional risk; there was no margin for any circumstance that would further reduce 
his command� This is exactly what occurred on the night of August 10, when 
Belvidera became separated from Shannon and Aeolus during a chase� Belvidera’s 
Captain Byron then captured Hare, an American merchant brig with a treasure 
trove of intelligence� Some weeks earlier, Hare had encountered Rodgers’s squad-
ron� Thinking the merchantman would beat the American squadron home, a 
number of letters were sent across� These now fell into British hands� Under-
standing their significance, Byron immediately pressed for Halifax�73
When Belvidera arrived on August 24, Byron not only brought Sawyer the cap-
tured letters; he provided the first reports of Broke’s movements over the previous 
month� Problematically, Byron did not have Broke’s actual reports—these were 
aboard Africa, which still was making its way slowly toward Halifax� Without a 
clear description of Broke’s intentions, Sawyer faced considerable uncertainty, but 
he needed to act quickly� The captured letters indicated that the Americans would 
return to the United States at the end of August� Sawyer directed the thirty-eight-
gun Spartan and thirty-six-gun Maidstone to reinforce Broke�74 These reinforce-
ments became even more important when Aeolus had to go in for water—Broke 
was now alone as Rodgers approached�75
At Halifax, Sawyer obtained additional intelligence about Rodgers from 
Statira, a thirty-eight-gun frigate that Sawyer had taken under his command after 
the start of hostilities� The ship encountered Rodgers’s squadron on August 26 
while patrolling along Saint Georges Bank� The distance between the American 
warships and Statira was enough to leave both sides in doubt about the exact 
nature of the encounter, but two days later Statira again fell in with the squadron, 
and this time the Americans spied the British frigate and gave chase� The pursuit 
lasted sixteen grueling hours before the weather came on thick, swallowing up 
the British ship�76 Rodgers again had failed to capture an isolated British warship; 
and, just as Belvidera had done two months earlier, Statira carried news of the 
encounter to Halifax� Sawyer quickly assembled another squadron comprising 
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Statira; the forty-gun Acasta and the thirty-eight-gun Nymphe, two other war-
time frigate reinforcements; and the former U�S� sloop Nautilus, now recom-
missioned as Emulous� This squadron sailed on September 2 with orders to find 
Broke and defeat the American squadron�77
This was all for naught, however� The same day that Statira made Halifax, the 
American squadron anchored at Boston� Sawyer characterized the American 
venture as “a very unsuccessful cruize—having taken and destroyed seven vessels 
of little value�”78 Rodgers certainly achieved less than he had desired� He failed 
to capture a single British warship or locate even a small British convoy� Yet the 
British could consider themselves extremely fortunate� The American squadron 
had chased Statira and had come within the narrowest margin of capturing Bel-
videra� And only a few miles had separated Rodgers from an extremely valuable 
but weakly escorted West India convoy of approximately 120 merchant vessels�
A RETURN TO THE LARGER PICTURE
Sawyer had devoted the best of his command to seeking out Rodgers’s squadron, 
at the expense of other responsibilities� Even as late as September 9, Sawyer wrote 
of “the inferior force I had to meet the various exigencies” on the station�79 Broke 
added, “I am bitterly disappointed at not meeting the squadron we are looking 
for—& who have diverted our attention from every other pursuit�”80 Privateers 
had damaged British commerce, and many American merchant vessels had es-
caped the tentacles of the Royal Navy while Broke sought Rodgers�
Worse still, British deployments had broken down� British actions hinged on 
Broke maintaining concentration at the critical point, but the nature of period 
communications and the lack of smaller vessels to carry reports between Broke 
and Sawyer curtailed effective interaction� Without efficient communications, 
the instructions Sawyer provided Broke in early July became critical� High levels 
of uncertainty caused Sawyer to allow Broke significant discretion in developing 
a course of action� By all evidence, Broke ably assessed available information 
and acted in accordance with the intent of his instructions and Britain’s strategic 
priorities� The result, however, drew Broke deep into the Atlantic to protect a 
vulnerable convoy� There was no way to keep Sawyer informed� After seeing the 
convoy to safety, Broke allowed his command to fragment� This was in part a re-
sponse to intelligence about the strength of Rodgers’s squadron, but other factors 
contributed to the five-ship squadron becoming five widely separated individual 
warships�
In the aftermath, Guerriere was lost in combat� Africa slowly lumbered back 
to Halifax with Broke’s reports� The delay in getting these to Sawyer further 
contributed to the uncertainty gripping British operations in late August and 
early September� Belvidera separated from Broke in a chase, then captured vital 
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intelligence about Rodgers’s movements� Captain Byron took the information to 
Halifax, since this was a fixed point, whereas seeking Broke was akin to finding a 
needle in a haystack� After apprising Sawyer at Halifax, Belvidera failed to rejoin 
Broke before Rodgers reached Boston�81 Aeolus parted with Shannon on August 
28 because of a lack of water� As luck would have it, Aeolus encountered Spartan 
and Maidstone the next day� They provided Aeolus with enough water to remain 
on station, but they failed to locate Shannon�82 Broke found himself alone on the 
American coast—and Rodgers slipped by everyone�
Then, adding insult to injury, Broke encountered the U�S� frigate Essex late 
in the afternoon of September 4� Although Shannon overhauled the American 
frigate, darkness fell before Broke could bring the American to action� It was a 
close-run affair, with the captain of Essex describing his escape as “extraordinary�” 
The result likely would have been quite different if Broke had had another frigate 
or two in company, allowing him to use multiple warships to cut off Essex�83 The 
lack of water, chance, and other priorities had left Broke alone, however�
BRITISH NAVAL LEADERSHIP
Captain Broke’s performance exemplifies naval leadership at the operational level 
of war� His assessment of intelligence, acceptance of risk, and decision making 
despite limited information provide instructive examples� Six weeks into the op-
eration, Broke’s squadron fragmented� This was, at least in part, the result of the 
choices he made; but how long can an isolated squadron commander maintain 
the mental acuity to make the best choices before uncertainty leads to negative 
results?
While Broke dealt with the single problem of Rodgers’s squadron, Sawyer had 
to master theater command� He had twenty-three warships at the outbreak of 
hostilities, and this number grew with the arrival of the thirty-six-gun Maidstone, 
thirty-eight-gun Nymphe, forty-gun Acasta, and thirty-eight-gun Statira� In addi-
tion, seven smaller warships arrived with convoys�84 These reinforcements were 
offset during the first three months of the war by the combat losses of the thirty-
eight-gun Guerriere and the schooner Laura, while the British lost the eighteen-
gun Emulous to the wiles of the ocean�85 Normal operations also diminished 
the command� Sawyer dispatched several warships with convoys, while others 
carried news of hostilities to distant locations� By September, Sawyer’s command 
was only slightly larger than it had been at the outbreak of hostilities; however, it 
did contain a larger percentage of frigates�
Sawyer juggled forces and prioritized commitments, acting most decisively 
when he received news of Rodgers’s squadron, first by dispatching Broke, then 
by sending Spartan and Maidstone, and finally by dispatching Statira, Nymphe, 
and Acasta� Convoys sailed at regular intervals—Sawyer did not interrupt their 
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sailings because of the war; in fact, he provided escorts for the unexpected con-
voy that departed British Canadian ports in the Bay of Fundy in July� Sawyer also 
provided warships to maintain a presence around Halifax and Bermuda, the two 
bases that were essential to sustaining his command�
Finally, Sawyer sought out American privateers� This proved easier than it 
should have been, owing to U�S� government delay in passing enabling legislation 
for commissioning private armed vessels, as well as the decision not to amend 
the 1812 Embargo Act to allow privateers to sail before it expired� For privateers, 
surprise came not from where but when they would strike� Commerce warfare 
could inflict more significant damage if conducted before widespread knowledge 
of the commencement of hostilities� Once Sawyer had learned of the declaration 
of war, he understood that the Gulf of Maine and the Bay of Fundy would be 
prime operating grounds� It would take longer for the Americans to commission 
a meaningful number of large, oceangoing privateers; until then, hastily com-
missioned, smaller private armed vessels could seek easy prizes in nearby waters� 
Overall, however, the British were less vulnerable than they should have been, 
owing to American delays and Sawyer’s foresight�
Sawyer managed naval deployments during the opening months of the war ef-
fectively, but the Admiralty decided he was unfit for independent command� He 
had been appointed to his position in October 1810, when North America was a 
backwater: tensions had calmed after the Leopard-Chesapeake incident, and the 
shooting incident between President and Little Belt was months in the future� But 
once the Admiralty became aware of hostilities in late July 1812, it sought a more 
experienced commander�
Although Sawyer managed naval operations effectively, he lacked an appre-
ciation of broader political considerations� In early July, Sawyer had dispatched 
Julia to England with “certain intelligence of the act of the Senate and House of 
Representatives of the United States Declaring War against Great Britain having 
been approved by the President�” When Julia’s commander, Valentine Gardner, 
brought Sawyer’s dispatches to the lords commissioners of the Admiralty, they 
censored Sawyer, noting “their regret that on a subject of such extreme impor-
tance as that of a declaration of war by America you should not have given their 
Lordships the particulars of the information which you state yourself to have 
received, and that you did not send the American official documents upon this 
subject which Captain Gardner of the Julia reports to have seen at Halifax�”86
Sawyer’s haste in dispatching this information to London likely led to the 
omissions� Certainly, he had operated in a vague sense of suspended anima-
tion for the week between Belvidera’s arrival at Halifax following the ship’s es-
cape from Rodgers’s squadron and the official confirmation of the war� These 
were tense and uncertain days, and it is understandable that Sawyer failed to 
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provide the Admiralty all the details� Although the omission might have been 
understandable, the Admiralty did not view it as excusable� For one thing, the 
First Lord of the Admiralty had to address other government leaders about the 
declaration of war without critical documentation, which was embarrassing� 
Moreover, Sawyer did not direct Captain Gardner to detain the mail and passen-
gers aboard Julia until the Admiralty had been informed about the declaration 
of war� This failure led the Admiralty to complain that the resultant “spillage” (to 
use a modern term) provided that “the Public was in possession of as early and 
more ample information than His Majesty’s Government” (emphasis original)�87 
This was not just embarrassing; it caused Britain’s political leaders to work at a 
disadvantage as they tried to address the outbreak of hostilities� So, while Sawyer 
may have managed naval operations on a distant station adequately, he lacked 
the political acumen to interface with the British government� There was more 
to command on a distant station than merely being proficient at the operational 
level of war� The Admiralty understood that Sawyer was operationally competent, 
but not politically savvy�
Rather than remove Sawyer, the Admiralty decided to amalgamate the North 
America, Leeward Islands, and Jamaica stations under a senior admiral who 
could provide the oversight necessary to link the political, strategic, and op-
erational aspects of Britain’s naval response to the War of 1812� Sawyer would 
remain the senior officer at Halifax, where he could focus on operational issues, 
while the new commander would manage operations from Halifax to Barbados�88 
The presumed ability of one officer to command such an extensive area of opera-
tions led to the following quip: “Why they have excluded the East Indies and the 
Mediterranean, I know not, for surely they might as rationally have been included 
in this most unprecedented command�”89 Certainly, it was unparalleled—and in 
fact proved unwieldy�
The Admiralty’s choice to fill the new positon was Admiral Sir John Borlase 
Warren� He had commanded in North America in the aftermath of the Leopard-
Chesapeake affair and had extensive experience both operationally and as a 
diplomat�90 Although Warren’s command included the North America, Leeward 
Islands, and Jamaica stations, it is telling that he sailed directly for Halifax� This 
was the decisive point for controlling British naval operations in its war against 
America, and Warren needed to establish communications with Sawyer to obtain 
firsthand information about the progress of the naval war�
When Captain Broke learned of the change, he wrote, “Sir John Warren’s ar-
rival makes a grand revolution in our government, poor Adml Sawyer is much 
hurt at the rude manner in which the Admty have deprived him of his chief 
command�—perhaps he will go home�”91 This was prophetic� Warren reached 
Halifax on September 26, and just days later Warren wrote privately to a member 
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of the Admiralty that Sawyer was “unwell & I believe it is so & he is very Grumpy 
also at what he calls being superseded in his command�” Rather than having a 
disgruntled subordinate, Warren gave Sawyer permission to return to England�92
With Warren’s arrival, the first chapter of Britain’s naval War of 1812 came to a 
close� Operationally, British naval leaders had demonstrated considerable skill at 
managing fog and friction while accounting for uncertainty� The British lacked 
a complete picture of American political intentions and an exact understanding 
of how the Americans planned to wage war at sea� This required leaders such as 
Admiral Sawyer and Captain Broke to work with available information and make 
assumptions about the rest�
At the same time, they had to prioritize� Prioritization does not come easily to 
a dominant naval power; after all, its navy should be able to master all threats� But 
in this case the available warships were insufficient, and it took time for reinforce-
ments to arrive� Sawyer and Broke sacrificed everything else to protect British 
commercial shipping� Warships protected convoys and the SLOCs rather than 
directly engaging American warships and privateers or sweeping up American 
commerce� Sawyer and Broke understood the difference between seeking battle 
and ensuring maritime security� In uncertain conditions and with a less-than-
adequate force, security took priority� British naval officers in North American 
waters showed a keen regard for Britain’s commercial position and understood 
the role of warships in supporting Britain’s global maritime trading empire�
Yet Sawyer’s reward was to be superseded as theater commander� The Admi-
ralty did not plan to remove Sawyer—he was an effective operator� Instead, Saw-
yer asked to be removed, since he felt aggrieved when the Admiralty placed War-
ren in a position to be his immediate superior� To demonstrate that the Admiralty 
held little ill will, the same First Lord of the Admiralty by 1814 had appointed 
Sawyer to command the Irish station� This was a command in close communi-
cation with London that oversaw convoys and patrols on the approaches to the 
English Channel—a command that demanded Sawyer’s expertise�93
However, the outbreak of war with the United States required a different 
type of know-how; it demanded an admiral who simultaneously could manage 
deployments and communicate broader strategic and even policy-level consid-
erations� Sawyer did not communicate well enough with his political superiors� 
Distance and the speed of communications certainly made exchanges with 
London more difficult, but these factors were known, and Sawyer could have 
accounted for them by lavishing more care on his reports, to include all available 
documentation� That he did not do so proved embarrassing, which led to friction 
between the civilian leaders and their senior officer at Halifax�
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Understanding intent, identifying objects, and managing risk are not the only 
hallmarks of success in decentralized command; clarity and precision in com-
munications prove just as important, for without these attributes, the tenuous 
links among decentralized nodes of authority become strained� The Americans 
contributed enough to the uncertain environment; ambiguity need not have been 
exacerbated by the failure of naval leaders to provide adequate communications 
with their civilian masters�
N O T E S
 1� Statements by Earl Bathurst (February 18, 
1813) and Viscount Castlereagh (February 18, 
1813), 24 Parl� Deb� (1st ser�) (1813), p� 609; 
Rory Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napo-
leon, 1807–1815 (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ� 
Press, 1996), pp� 234–35�
 2� William Hamilton to Foster, May 11, 1812, 
and Castlereagh to Foster, June 17 and 23, 
1812 (and Attached Memorandum), in 
Instructions to the British Ministers of the 
United States, 1791–1812, ed� Bernard Mayo 
(New York: Da Capo, 1971), pp� 379, 381–83; 
London Gazette, June 23–27, 1812; Jon Lat-
imer, 1812: War with America (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard Univ� Press, 2007), pp� 33–34� 
It should be noted that the suspension of the 
orders in council would become permanent 
only if the U�S� government responded by 
ending its restrictions on British shipping�
 3� Croker to Sawyer, July 29, 1812, pp� 28–29, 
Admiralty Papers [hereafter ADM] 2/1375, 
The National Archives, Kew, U�K� [hereafter 
TNA]; Warren to Croker, October 5, 1812, 
p� 98, ADM 1/502, TNA; Robert Stewart, 
“Statement of British Naval Forces on the 
North American Stations, 1810–1813,” in 
Correspondence, Despatches, and Other Papers 
of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquess of 
Londonderry, ed� Charles W� Vane, Marquess 
of Londonderry (London: William Shoberl, 
1851) [hereafter Castlereagh], vol� 8, p� 289�
 4� Instructions to Sawyer, October 7, 1810, pp� 
175–99, ADM 1/159, TNA�
 5� Regarding ships and the number of their 
guns, throughout this article: For British 
warships, the number of guns is drawn from 
“Ships in Sea Service,” July 1, 1812, ADM 
8/100, TNA� For American warships, the 
number comes from Paul Hamilton [Secre-
tary of the Navy] to William Giles [Chairman, 
Foreign Relations Committee, U�S� Senate], 
December 14, 1811, in American State Papers: 
Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the 
Congress of the United States; Naval Affairs, 
ed� Walter Lowrie and Walter S� Franklin 
(Washington, DC: Gales and Seaton, 1834), 
vol� 1, pp� 265–66�
 6� The bicentennial of the War of 1812 has 
stimulated significant scholarship on the na-
val war� A survey of the most important new 
studies includes Stephen Budiansky, Perilous 
Fight: America’s Intrepid War with Britain on 
the High Seas, 1812–1815 (New York: Knopf, 
2010); George C� Daughan, 1812: The Navy’s 
War (New York: Basic Books, 2011); Brian 
Arthur, How Britain Won the War of 1812: 
The Royal Navy’s Blockades of the United 
States, 1812–1815 (Woodbridge, U�K�: Boy-
dell, 2011); and Andrew Lambert, The Chal-
lenge: Britain against America in the Naval 
War of 1812 (London: Faber and Faber, 2012)� 
However, none of these works have addressed 
British naval decision making at the outbreak 
of the war specifically� Studies that do address 
the opening of the naval war are more dated� 
Jeff Seiken provides the American perspective 
in “‘To Strike a Blow in the World That Shall 
Resound through the Universe’: American 
Naval Operations and Options at the Start 
of the War of 1812,” in New Interpretations 
in Naval History: Selected Papers from the 
Fourteenth Naval History Symposium, ed� 
Randy C� Balano and Craig L� Symonds (An-
napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), pp� 
131–46� Barry J� Lohnes penned an article in 
1973 addressing the British navy at Halifax� 
While superb at identifying the constraints 
NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb   20 8/7/17   11:58 AM
20
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 4, Art. 6
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/6
 9 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
the British faced, Lohnes fails to explain what 
reasonably could be expected from the British 
naval force at the outbreak of hostilities� See 
“British Naval Problems at Halifax during 
the War of 1812,” Mariner’s Mirror 59, no� 3 
(1973), pp� 317–33� There is no biography 
of Sawyer� Broke received an edited volume 
in 2013, but it focused on his critical victory 
over the U�S� frigate Chesapeake rather than 
his decision making in the early months of 
the war� See Tim Voelcker, ed�, Broke of the 
Shannon and the War of 1812 (Barnsley, U�K�: 
Seaforth, 2013)�
 7� Statement by Croker, February 18, 1813, 24 
Parl� Deb� (1st ser�) (1813), p� 645�
 8� Castlereagh, vol� 8, pp� 287–88� Note: these 
points are direct quotes from the British 
document�
 9� Ibid�
 10� Ibid�, p� 288�
 11� Julian S� Corbett, “Napoleon and the British 
Navy after Trafalgar,” Quarterly Review, no� 
471 (April 1922), pp� 238–39; Arthur, How 
Britain Won the War of 1812, p� 57; Lambert, 
The Challenge, p� 17; James Davey, In Nelson’s 
Wake: The Navy and the Napoleonic Wars 
(New Haven, CT: Yale Univ� Press, 2015), pp� 
313–14; Kevin D� McCranie, “The War of 
1812 in the Ongoing Napoleonic Wars: The 
Response of Britain’s Royal Navy,” Journal of 
Military History 76, no� 4 (October 2012), pp� 
1067–94; Kevin D� McCranie, “Britain’s Royal 
Navy and the Defeat of Napoleon,” in Napo-
leon and the Operational Art of War: Essays 
in Honor of Donald D. Horward, ed� Michael 
V� Leggiere (Leiden, Neth�: Brill, 2016), pp� 
476–99�
 12� “Ships in Sea Service,” July 1, 1812�
 13� Patrick Crowhurst, The Defence of British 
Trade, 1689–1815 (Folkestone, U�K�: Dawson, 
1977), p� 171; N� A� M� Rodger, “Weather, 
Geography and Naval Power in the Age of 
Sail,” Journal of Strategic Studies 22, nos� 2–3 
(1999), p� 191�
 14� Byron to Sawyer, June 27, 1812, ADM 1/502, 
TNA; Log of Belvidera, June 23, 1812, ADM 
51/2018, TNA�
 15� Log of Belvidera, June 27, 1812, ADM 
51/2018, TNA; Sawyer to Croker, July 5, 1812, 
p� 45, ADM 1/502, TNA�
 16� Castlereagh, vol� 8, p� 287�
 17� Spencer C� Tucker and Frank T� Reuter, In-
jured Honor: The Chesapeake-Leopard Affair, 
June 22, 1807 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 1996); Jonathon Woodard Hooks, “A 
Friendly Salute: The President–Little Belt 
Affair and the Coming of the War of 1812” 
(PhD dissertation, Univ� of Alabama, 2009)�
 18� “Naval History of the Present Year, 1812 
(June–July),” Naval Chronicle 28, pp� 73–74�
 19� Castlereagh, vol� 8, p� 288�
 20� Sawyer to Croker, July 5, 1812�
 21� Foster to Sawyer, Washington, June 15, 1812, 
p� 44, ADM 1/502, TNA; Bradford Perkins, 
Prologue to War, 1805–1812 (Berkeley: Univ� 
of California Press, 1968), p� 406; Donald R� 
Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict 
(Urbana: Univ� of Illinois Press, 1989), p� 41�
 22� Sawyer to Croker, July 21, 1812, p� 68, ADM 
1/502, TNA�
 23� “Ships in Sea Service,” July 1, 1812� Twenty-
three is the number of operational warships, 
which omits noncombat vessels such as 
receiving ships�
 24� Jan Glete, Navies and Nations: Warships, 
Navies and State Building in Europe and 
America, 1500–1860, Stockholm Studies in 
History 48 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 
1993), vol� 2, p� 376�
 25� McCranie, “The War of 1812 in the Ongoing 
Napoleonic Wars�”
 26� Broke to his wife, July 2, 1812, Broke Papers, 
HA 93/9/105, Suffolk Record Office, Ipswich, 
U�K� [hereafter SRO]�
 27� Sawyer to Croker, July 5, 1812�
 28� Sawyer to Croker, July 21, 1812, p� 68�
 29� An Act Concerning Letters of Marque, Prizes, 
and Prize Goods, June 26, 1812, in The Naval 
War of 1812: A Documentary History, ed� Wil-
liam S� Dudley et al� (Washington, DC: Naval 
Historical Center, 1985), vol� 1, pp� 167–69�
 30� Latimer, 1812: War with America, p� 33�
 31� The Columbian (New York), July 2, 1812�
 32� Sawyer to Croker, July 5, 1812�
 33� Sawyer to Croker, July 21, 1812; Log of Spar-
tan, August 1–3, 1812, ADM 51/2812, TNA; 
Commercial Advertiser (New York), August 
15, 1812�
NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb   21 8/7/17   11:58 AM
21
McCranie: Confronting Uncertainty with Decentralized Command, British Naval
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
 M C C R A N I E  9 9
 34� H[erbert] Sawyer, “List of American Priva-
teers Taken � � � between the 1st July and 25th 
August 1812,” in The Naval War of 1812: A 
Documentary History, ed� Dudley et al�, vol� 1, 
pp� 225–26� The first capture occurred on July 
16, the final one on August 21�
 35� Castlereagh, vol� 8, p� 288�
 36� Sawyer to Broke, July 4, 1812, p� 351, ADM 
1/1553, TNA�
 37� Ibid�
 38� The name of this ship appears throughout 
without a diacritical accent� When it was in 
French service, an accent was used; once it 
entered British service, the accent was dis-
pensed with�
 39� “Ships in Sea Service,” July 1, 1812; Sawyer 
to Croker, July 5, 1812; Rif Winfield, Brit-
ish Warships in the Age of Sail, 1793–1817: 
Design, Construction, Careers and Fates 
(London: Chatham, 2005), p� 100; Brian 
Lavery, Nelson’s Navy: The Ships, Men and 
Organisation 1793–1815 (London: Conway 
Maritime, 1994; repr� Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2003), p� 48; Brian Lavery, The 
Ship of the Line, vol� 1, The Development of 
the Battlefleet 1650–1850 (London: Conway 
Maritime, 1983), p� 126�
 40� Broke to Sawyer, July 12, 1812, no� 2, HA 
93/6/2/8, SRO�
 41� Ibid�
 42� Sawyer to Croker, July 21, 1812� The intel-
ligence indicated that the squadron under 
Rodgers consisted of President, United States, 
Congress, Hornet, and Wasp� The only dif-
ference was that Rodgers’s actual squadron 
included the sixteen-gun Argus instead of the 
eighteen-gun Wasp�
 43� Kevin D� McCranie, Utmost Gallantry: The 
U.S. and Royal Navies at Sea in the War of 
1812 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2011), p� xiii�
 44� Paul H� Silverstone, The Sailing Navy 1775–
1854 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2001), pp� 28, 30; Winfield, British Warships, 
pp� 165, 176�
 45� William James, Naval History of Great Britain 
(London: Harding, Lepard, 1826; repr� Lon-
don: Macmillan, 1902), vol� 5, p� 381; William 
James, Naval Occurrences of the War of 1812: 
A Full and Correct Account of the Naval War 
between Great Britain and the United States of 
America, 1812–1815 (repr� London: Conway 
Maritime, 2004), p� 8�
 46� Theodore Roosevelt, The Naval War of 1812; 
or, The History of the United States Navy dur-
ing the Last War with Great Britain, 3rd ed� 
(New York: G� P� Putnam, 1883), p� 60�
 47� “Ship Manning and Guns,” ADM 7/556, TNA; 
Winfield, British Warships, pp� 100, 124; 
Silverstone, The Sailing Navy, 1775–1854, pp� 
26–27�
 48� “Ship Manning and Guns”; Silverstone, The 
Sailing Navy, 1775–1854, pp� 26, 28, 46–47; 
Winfield, British Warships, pp� 100, 154, 165, 
168, 176�
 49� Broke to Croker, July 30, 1812, p� 351, ADM 
1/1553, TNA� 
 50� Sawyer to Croker, July 21, 1812� Thalia was a 
thirty-six-gun frigate�
 51� Rodgers to Hamilton, June 21, 1812 (two 
letters of this date), pp� 47–48, Letters from 
Captains, M125, reel 24, record group 45, 
National Archives and Records Administra-
tion, United States [hereafter RG 45, NARA]�
 52� Broke to Sawyer, July 14, 1812, no� 4, HA 
93/6/2/8, SRO�
 53� Ibid�; Silverstone, The Sailing Navy, 1775–
1854, p� 28; Winfield, British Warships, p� 165�
 54� Faye M� Kert, Privateering: Patriots & Profits 
in the War of 1812 (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins Univ� Press, 2015), pp� 21–22�
 55� Broke to Sawyer, July 14, 1812�
 56� Ibid�
 57� Ibid�
 58� Hamilton to Rodgers, June 18, 1812, p� 61, 
Letters to Officers, M149, reel 10, RG 45, 
NARA�
 59� Hamilton to Crane, July 10, 11, 1812, pp� 
92–93, M149, reel 10, RG 45, NARA; Crane 
to Hamilton, July 29, 1812, p� 114, Letters 
from Officers below the Rank of Commander, 
M148, reel 10, RG 45, NARA�
 60� Hull to Hamilton, July 7, 1812, p� 94, M125, 
reel 24, RG 45, NARA; Hamilton to Hull, 
June 1, July 3, 1812, pp� 61, 86, M149, reel 10, 
RG 45, NARA; Broke to Croker, July 30, 1812�
 61� Broke to Sawyer, July 14, 1812, entry for July 
21, no� 4, HA 93/6/2/8, SRO�
NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb   22 8/7/17   11:58 AM
22
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 4, Art. 6
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/6
 1 0 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
 62� Ibid�
 63� Broke to Croker, July 30, 1812�
 64� Pocket journal of Shannon, July 24–29, 1812, 
HA 93/10/24, SRO; Journal of Shannon, July 
24–29, 1812, HA 93/6/2/112, SRO; Log of 
Thetis, July 29, 1812, ADM 51/2874, TNA� 
This convoy originally had a second escort, 
the twenty-two-gun Garland, but that ship 
parted with the convoy in the Straits of 
Florida�
 65� Broke to Croker, July 30, 1812�
 66� Vashon to Stirling, June 8, 1812, Stirling to 
Croker, July 13, 1812, p� 138, ADM 1/263/124, 
TNA; Byam to Croker, August 24, 1812, 
ADM 1/1553/359, TNA; Log of Garland, July 
1–2, 11–12, 1812, ADM 53/572, TNA�
 67� Rodgers to Hamilton, September 1, 1812, p� 2, 
M125, reel 25, RG 45, NARA�
 68� Admiralty response attached to Broke to Cro-
ker, July 30, 1812, ADM 1/1553/351, TNA�
 69� Broke to Sawyer, August 7, 1812, no� 11, HA 
93/6/2/8, SRO; Log of Shannon, August 5–9, 
1812, ADM 51/2861, TNA�
 70� Broke to Sawyer, August 7, 1812; Log of 
Africa, August 8–14, 1812, ADM 51/2092, 
TNA� For information on Constitution and 
Guerriere, see James, Naval History of Great 
Britain, vol� 5, pp� 371–83; Robert Gardiner, 
The Naval War of 1812 (London: Chatham, 
1998), pp� 40–43; Lambert, The Challenge, pp� 
75–78; Daughan, 1812: The Navy’s War, pp� 
73–85; Budiansky, Perilous Fight, pp� 141–47; 
and McCranie, Utmost Gallantry, pp� 48–52�
 71� Broke to Sawyer, August 7, 1812�
 72� Broke to his wife, September 22, 1812, HA 
93/9/113, SRO�
 73� Sawyer to Croker, August 25, 1812, p� 83, 
ADM 1/502, TNA; Log of Belvidera, August 
21, 1812, ADM 51/2018, TNA�
 74� Sawyer to Croker, August 25, 1812, p� 83�
 75� Broke to his wife, August 23, 1812, entry for 
August 28, HA 93/9/110, SRO�
 76� Rodgers to Hamilton, September 1, 1812; 
Sawyer to Croker, September 9, 1812, ADM 
1/502/92, TNA; Logs of Hornet, United States, 
and Congress, August 26–28, 1812, record 
group 24, NARA; Log of Statira, August 26, 
28, 1812, ADM 51/2814, TNA�
 77� Sawyer to Croker, September 9, 1812�
 78� Sawyer to Croker, September 17, 1812, ADM 
1/502, TNA�
 79� Sawyer to Croker, September 9, 1812�
 80� Broke to his wife, August 9, 1812, HA 
93/9/109, SRO�
 81� Log of Belvidera, August 15–September 5, 
1812, ADM 51/2018, TNA�
 82� Log of Aeolus, August 28–31, 1812, ADM 
51/2106, TNA�
 83� Porter to Hamilton, September 2, 1812, p� 18, 
M125, reel 25, RG 45, NARA; Log of Shan-
non, September 4, 1812, ADM 51/2861, TNA�
 84� Castlereagh, vol� 8, p� 288�
 85� Warren to Croker, October 5, 1812, p� 98; 
Winfield, British Warships, pp� 176, 295, 360� 
When this existing Emulous was lost in 1812, 
the Royal Navy applied the name to the for-
mer USS Nautilus, as noted earlier� The latter 
ship was sold out of the service in 1817�
 86� Croker to Sawyer, July 29, 1812�
 87� Ibid�
 88� Croker to William Hamilton, August 3, 1812, 
pp� 33–34, ADM 2/1375, TNA�
 89� Lord Radstock to Son, August 4, 1812, 
Waldegrave Family Papers, WDG/11/13/27, 
National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, U�K� 
[hereafter NMM]�
 90� Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s�v� 
“Sir John Borlase Warren”; Peter LeFevre, “Sir 
John Borlase Warren, 1753–1822,” in British 
Admirals of the Napoleonic Wars: The Con-
temporaries of Nelson, ed� Peter LeFevre and 
Richard Harding (London: Chatham, 2005), 
pp� 229–44�
 91� Broke to his wife, September 22, 1812, entry 
for September 27, HA 93/9/114, SRO�
 92� Warren to Johnstone Hope, October 7, 
1812, Correspondence with Lord Melville, 
MEL/101, NMM; Warren to Croker, October 
18, 1812, p� 111, ADM 1/502, TNA�
 93� Various letters, 1814, Cork, Irish station, 
ADM 1/626, TNA�
NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb   23 8/7/17   11:58 AM
23
McCranie: Confronting Uncertainty with Decentralized Command, British Naval
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
